

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISO-00 NEAE-00 IO-13 ACDA-12  
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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE  
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CINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 KABUL 6240

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PEPR, US, UR, IR, AF, PK, CH  
SUBJECT: AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER COMPALINS ABOUT PAKISTANI  
INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

REF: A. KABUL 6168, B. KABUL 6154, C. ISLAMBBB 7429

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. FOREIGN MINISTER HAFIZUALLH AMIN SEIZED  
THE OPPORTUNITY OF MY CALL ON HIM ON JULY 31 TO ACCUSE THE  
PAKISTANIS OF MEDDLING IN INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS, AND OF  
ENGAGING IN SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN.  
WITHOUT SAYING SO EXPLICITLY, HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE  
EXPECTED US TO WARN PAKISTAN TO CEASE SUCH INTERFERENCE.  
AMIN SAID THAT THE AFGHANS WILL TRY NOT TO BE PROVOKED  
INTO TAKING ANY COUNTERACTION, BUT WARNED THAT THE PROBLEM

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COULD ESCALATE WERE PAKISTAN TO CONTINUE ITS ACTIVITIES  
AND TO RECEIVE INCREASED ARMS ASSISTANCE FROM SOME OTHER  
POWER, CITING CHINA AS AN EXAMPLE, THEREBY FORCING THE  
AFGHANS TO UPGRADE THEIR OWN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT  
WITH OUTSIDE HELP. (ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT NAME THE SOURCE OF  
SUCH ASSISTANCE, HE CLEARLY ALLUDED TO THE USSR.) I AVOIDED ANY  
COMMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT WE WOULD INTERVENE WITH THE

PAKISTANIS, BUT SUGGESTED INSTEAD THAT THE BEST WAY TO REMOVE APPREHENSIONS AND POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WAS TO ENGAGE IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ISLAMABAD. END SUMMARY

2. ACCOMPANIED BY THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR, I CALLED, AT MY REQUEST, ON FOREIGN MINISTER AMIN ON JULY 31 TO DISCUSS U.S. VIEWS ON PUERTO RICO AND THE BONN ANTI-HIJACKING DECLARATION (REPORTED SEPARATELY). AFTER I HAD CONCLUDED MY BUSINESS, AMIN RAISED THE TOPIC OF AFGHAN-PAKISTANI RELATIONS, EXPLAINING THAT HE WAS ADDRESSING HIS POINTS TO ME BECAUSE AMERICA IS A SPECIAL FRIEND OF PAKISTAN.

3. AMIN COMPLAINED BITTERLY ABOUT PAKISTANI ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (DRA). I RECALLED THAT DEFENSE MINISTER ABDUL QADER HAD MADE A SIMILAR COMPLAINT A FEW DAYS EARLIER (REF TEL B), AND ASKED WHAT WAS SPECIFICALLY TROUBLING THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. AMIN MADE A VAGUE REFERENCE TO CROSS-BORDER TRAFFIC BY PAKISTANI-BASED TROUBLEMAKERS. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, AMIN ALSO MADE VAGUE REFERENCE TO "SABOTAGE". AMIN DID NOT SPECIFY WHETHER HE WAS REFERRING TO OPERATIONS DIRECTLY MOUNTED BY THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT, OR MERELY PERMITTED BY THEM, BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE DRA WAS HOLDING ISLAMABAD ACCOUNTABLE.

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4. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, AMIN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT PAKISTAN'S MOTIVATION MIGHT BE TO PROVOKE AFGHANISTAN SO THAT THE DRA WOULD BE PORTRAYED TO THE U.S. AND THE WORLD AS A DANGEROUS COMMUNIST STATE, THUS OPENING THE WAY FOR PAKISTANI REQUESTS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT. AMIN INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMUNIST IMAGE WOULD MEAN IN TERMS OF CONTINUED U.S. AID TO AFGHANISTAN.

5. AMIN EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN THAT PAKISTAN MIGHT INCREASE ITS ARMED MIGHT TO EVEN MORE THREATENING LEVELS THROUGH ARMS ASSISTANCE FROM SOME OTHER POWER, "SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, CHINA." HE SAID THAT SUCH A THREAT WOULD HAVE TO BE COUNTERED BY AFGHANISTAN'S BEEFING UP ITS ARMED FORCES ESTABLISHMENT ADEQUATELY. HE DID NOT NAME THE SOURCE FOR THIS ARMS ASSISTANCE, BUT CLEARLY MEANT THE SOVIET UNION. AMIN COMMENTED THAT SUCH AN ARMS RACE WOULD BE A SOURCE OF GREAT CONCERN FOR OTHER REGIONAL STATES, SUCH AS IRAN AND INDIA.

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6. WITHOUT MAKING AN EXPLICIT REQUEST, AMIN HINTED THAT THE U.S. MAKE CLEAR TO ITS PAKISTANI FRIENDS THE NEED FOR STOPPING HOSTILE ACTIVITY AGAINST THE DRA. HE OBSERVED THAT THE AFGHANS -- IF THEY WERE SO INCLINED -- COULD ALSO MOUNT SABOTAGE OPERATIONS IN PAKISTAN. HE ADDED THAT THE AFGHANS WOULD NOT LIKE TO BE FORCED TO THIS LIMIT, HOWEVER, "BECAUSE BOMBS ARE UNHUMANITARIAN". IN THIS CONNECTION, AMIN POINTEDLY ASKED WHETHER THE USG WOULD UNDERSTAND IT IF AFGHANISTAN WERE FORCED TO TAKE ANY COUNTERACTION. WHEN I RECALLED THAT GENERAL QADER HAD SAID THAT THE DRA WOULD MAKE "AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE" TO ANY THREAT FROM PAKISTAN, AMIN SAID THAT GENERALS ARE NOT TRAINED TO USE CAREFUL  
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AND DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE, AND HE THEREFORE WISHED TO ASSURE ME THAT THE DRA WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO

AVOID BEING PROVOKED.

7. IN MY RESPONSE, I FIRST ASKED WHY THE AFGHANS HAD NOT TAKEN UP THEIR CONCERNS DIRECTLY WITH THE PAKISTANIS, WONDERING WHY WE HAD TO SERVE AS AN INTERMEDIARY. (WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY A PAKISTANI DIPLOMAT THAT, AS RECENTLY AS JULY 26, PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR ALI ARSHAD WAS ASSURED BY PRIME MINISTER NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI THAT THE DRA WAS SATISFIED THAT ISLAMABAD WAS NOT INVOLVED IN ANY ANTI-AFGHAN ACTIVITIES IN THE FRONTIER REGION.) I POINTED OUT THAT ONE OF THE INTERESTING DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH ASIA OVER THE PAST YEARS HAS BEEN THE TENDENCY FOR COUNTRIES IN THE REGION TO WORK OUT THEIR PROBLEMS ON A BILATERAL BASIS AND WITHOUT INTERFERENCE BY LARGE OUTSIDE POWERS. I CITED EXAMPLES, INCLUDING THE APPARENT REDUCTION IN TENSIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. AMIN'S ANSWER WAS UNRESPONSIVE. HE REPLIED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT PLAN TO TALK TO THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT UNTIL THEY WERE READY TO DISCUSS "THE PROBLEM" (I.E., PUSHTUNISTAN).

8. WHILE ON THE TOPIC OF PUSHTUNISTAN, AMIN CLAIMED THAT THE CURRENT DRA STAND ON THAT ISSUE DOES NOT DIFFER MATERIALLY FROM THAT ADVANCED BY THE DAOUD REGIME "DURING ITS LAST MONTH," CLAIMING THAT THE "PROPAGANDA" LEVEL WAS NEITHER MORE NOR LESS, AND THAT THE DRA WAS MAKING A CONCERTED EFFORT NOT TO HEAT UP THIS LEVEL. (THIS IS NOT ENTIRELY ACCURATE, FOR THE DAOUD REGIME CAREFULLY AVOIDED ANY CLAIM THAT KABUL WAS A NEGOTIATING PARTY IN THE MATTER -- ASSERTING ONLY THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE WORKED OUT DIRECTLY BETWEEN  
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THE PAKISTANI PUSHTUNS AND THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT. IN CONTRAST, THE TARAKI REGIME DEMANDS AND NEGOTIATING ROLE.) AMIN STATED THAT THE DRA HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHAT THE SOLUTION SHOULD BE. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE SOLUTION COULD RANGE FROM COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE FOR

PUSHTUNISTAN TO ITS CONTINUED INCORPORATION WITHIN PAKISTAN.

9. WHEN I ASKED WHY THE PAKISTANIS SHOULD NOT FEEL PROVOKED WHEN AMIN MAKES PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, SUCH AS THE RECENT BELGRADE NONALIGNED CONFERENCE, ABOUT THE "NATIONAL DESTINY" OF THE PUSHTUN AND BALUCH PEOPLES, AMIN RETORTED THAT THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN A HISTORICAL FACT SINCE THE CREATION OF PAKISTAN IN 1947. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY WHY THE PAKISTANIS HAD ALWAYS DENIED THERE WAS A PUSHTUNISTAN PROBLEM -- AND

YET WERE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE THE ISSUE WITH AFGHANISTAN.  
HE SAW THAT AS A PAKISTANI ADMISSION THAT THE PROBLEM  
INDEED EXISTS.

10. AMIN MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CANNOT  
IGNORE THE PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE NOR FAIL TO PROMOTE THE  
INTERESTS OF THE PUSHTUN AND BALUCH PEOPLE. THE DRA  
DOES NOT HAVE ANY OTHER OPTION THAN CONTINUED ATTENTION  
TO THE PROBLEM BECAUSE "THE PEOPLE" EXPECT IT OF THEIR  
GOVERNMENT.

11. MAKING IT CLEAR THAT I DID NOT HAVE ANY INDEPENDENT  
EVIDENCE TO CONFIRM OR DENY HIS PRESENTATION, I SAID  
I APPRECIATED GETTING HIS PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION.  
I REPEATED TO AMIN WHAT UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM HAD  
TOLD HIM AND TARAKI ON JULY 13 ABOUT OUR DESIRE THAT  
AFGHANISTAN MAINTAIN STABLE AND PEACEFUL RELATIONS  
WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN. AMIN STATED THAT KABUL'S  
RELATIONS WITH IRAN WERE GOOD. HE OBSERVED THAT IRAN,  
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UNLIKE PAKISTAN, WAS NOT ENGAGING IN ANY ANTI-AFGHAN  
ACTIVITY ALONG ITS BORDERS. (MOST OF THE AFGH,-  
IRANIAN BORDER RUNS THROUGH EMPTY, DESOLATE DESERT  
TERRITORY, AND THE IRANIANS DO NOT HAVE TO CONTEND WITH  
ANYTHING LIKE THE MOUNTAINOUS, ESSENTIALLY LAWLESS  
TRIBAL REGION WHICH STRADDLES THE AFGHAN-PAKISTANI  
FRONTIER. A PAKISTANI DIPLOMAT HERE RECENTLY ADMITTED  
TO AN EMBASSY OFFICER THAT THERE ARE GREAT TRACTS OF NWFP  
TRIBAL TERRITORY WHICH ARE NOT UNDER EFFECTIVE  
PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT CONTROL.)

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y PARAGRAPH NUMBERS (14, 15, AND 16  
VICE 15, 16, AND 17)

12. I STRESSED AMERICAN CONCERN OVER ANY THREAT TO  
REGIONAL STABILITY AND ASSURED AMIN THAT THE USG  
REGARDED BOTH AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AS FRIENDS.  
I ALSO EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN OVER ANY REGIONAL DISRUPTIONS  
WHICH MIGHT DIVERT THE TWO COUNTRIES FROM THE IMPORTANT  
TASK OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND REAFFIRMED OUR  
POSITION ON NONINTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF  
AFGHANISTAN. I DID NOT RESPOND TO HIS IMPLIED SUG-  
GESTION THAT WE INTERCEDED WITH PAKISTAN TO ASK IT TO  
CEASE ITS ALLEGED PROVOCATIONS. AMIN THEN TERMINATED  
THE CONVERSATION, APOLOGIZING FOR HAVING BURDENED US  
WITH SO MUCH DETAIL ABOUT HIS GOVERNMENT'S PROBLEMS  
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WITH PAKISTAN.

13. THE DAY BEFORE THE MEETING WITH AMIN, OUR POLITICAL  
COUNSELOR CONVEYED THE GIST OF THE EARLIER CONVERSATION  
WITH DEFENSE MINISTER QADER (REF B) TO TANVIR AHMAD  
KHAN, PAKISTANI DCM, WHO AGREED THAT THE AFGHANS HAD  
PROBABLY INTENDED TO USE THE U.S. AS A MESSENGER.  
TANVIR WAS PUZZLED, HOWEVER, WHY TARAKI HAD CONVEYED  
THE OPPOSITE VIEW TO HIS OWN AMBASSADOR ON THE SAME  
DAY. HE THOUGHT THAT THE AFGHANS WERE EMPLOYING  
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE TO KEEP ISLAMABAD OFF BALANCE.  
TANVIR CLAIMED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS BENDING OVER  
BACKWARD TO CONVINCE THE AFGHANS THAT THEY WANT TO BE  
FRIENDLY AND HELPFUL. HE CITED, AS AN EXAMPLE, THE  
HIGH PRIORITY AFGHAN FREIGHT TRANSIT HAS BEEN RECEIVING  
IN PAKISTAN. (IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH AN EMBASSY  
OFFICER, AN AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGED  
THAT TRANSIT SERVICES THROUGH PAKISTAN HAVE INDEED BEEN

"EXCELLENT.") ACCORDING TO TANVIR, THE STRATEGY BEING PROMOTED BY HIS EMBASSY AT KABUL -- AND PRESUMABLY BEING SOLD BY AMBASSADOR ALI ARSHAD DURING HIS BIMONTHLY CONFERENCES AT ISLAMABAD, IS TO KEEP THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH AFGHANISTAN AS NORMAL AS POSSIBLE, TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE TO THE AFGHANS, AND TO GIVE KABUL ABSOLUTELY NO CAUSE FOR SUSPICION OF HOSTILE INTENT. THIS MODERATE PAKISTANI STRATEGY IS BASED UPON THE HOPE THAT THE ACTUAL EXPERIENCE OF RULING AFGHANISTAN WILL EVENTUALLY MODERATE THE AFGHAN LEADERSHIP AND LEAD THEM TO RETURN TO THE TRAIN OF DAUD'S WELL-ADVANCED DETENTE NEGOTIATIONS WITH PAKISTAN.

14. COMMENT: SUSPICIONS OF PAKISTAN ARE UNDENIABLY HEIGHTENING ON THIS SIDE OF THE DURAND LINE, BUT IT IS SECRET

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DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER AMIN'S FEARS ARE PURPOSELY EXAGGERATED OR WHETHER THEY ARE, INDEED, GENUINE. SINCE THE REGIME'S HIGHEST PRIORITY IS TO PROTECT ITS SECURITY AND MAINTENANCE OF POWER, IT MUST VIEW WITH ACUTE ALARM ANY CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY WHICH IT WOULD CONNECT WITH RESISTANCE GROUPS OR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS. IF SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE TAKING PLACE, I DOUBT WHETHER THE REGIME WOULD APPRECIATE THAT IT MAY BE SOMETHING OVER WHICH ISLAMABAD HAS NO CONTROL, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE TERRAIN INVOLVED AND THE ABSENCE OF FULL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF THE AREA BY ISLAMABAD. WHATEVER THE SITUATION MAY BE, AMIN HAS TAKEN THE INITIATIVE BY POINTING THE FINGER AT ISLAMABAD. BY DOING SO, HE KEEPS ISLAMABAD OFF BALANCE, BUT ALSO HOPES THAT WE WOULD BE DETERRED FROM SUPPLYING MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN FOR THE ALLEGED PURPOSE OF COMBATING THE ALLEGED COMMUNIST THREAT FROM AFGHANISTAN. AT THE SAME TIME, HE IS UNDOUBTEDLY INFORMING THE SOVIETS OF ALLEGED THREATS FROM PAKISTAN, THUS ALERTING MOSCOW TO POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL REQUESTS FOR MILITARY HARDWARE.

15. ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD PASS ON AFGHAN CONCERNS TO PAKISTAN IN THE HOPE THAT THE SITUATION CAN BE DEFUSED THROUGH BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN KABUL AND ISLAMABAD, I SEE NOTHING TO BE GAINED AT THIS POINT BY TRYING TO PLAY THE ROLE OF A MEDIATOR. THIS GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO FACE PROBLEMS WITH TRIBAL GROUPS FOR SOME TIME TO COME, AND EVEN WITH THE BEST OF GOOD WILL AND INTENTIONS, ISLAMABAD MAY BE LIMITED IN WHAT IT CAN DO TO CONTROL CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY THAT IS HOSTILE TO THE DRA. THUS, I RECOMMEND AGAINST UNDUE INVOLVEMENT IN A NO-WIN SITUATION, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S AND ISLAMABAD'S VIEWS ON HOW THEY SEE THE

U.S. ROLE IN THE CURRENT SITUATION.

16. I ASSUME THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS NO OBJECTIONS IN  
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MY PASSING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF AMIN'S COMMENTS TO  
PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR ALI ARSHAD, AND TO EMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
DOING THE SAME WITH PAKISTANI COLLEAGUES IN ISLAMABAD.  
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## Message Attributes

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**TAGS:** PEPR, US, UR, IR, AF, PK, CH, (DUBS, ADOLPH), (AMIN, HAFIZULLAH)  
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